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On the optimal timing of capital taxes
Abstract
For many kinds of capital, depreciation rates change systematically with the age of the capital. Consider
an example that captures essential aspects of human capital, both regarding its accumulation and its
depreciation: a worker obtains knowledge in period 0, then uses this knowledge in production in periods
1 and 2, and thereafter retires. Here, depreciation accelerates: it occurs at a 100% rate after period 2, and
at a lower (perhaps zero) rate before that. The present paper analyzes the implications of non-constant
depreciation rates for the optimal timing of taxes on capital income. The main finding is that under
natural assumptions, the path of tax rates over time must be oscillatory. Oscillatory tax rates are optimal
when depreciation rates accelerate with the age of the capital (as in the above example), and provided
that the government can commit to the path of future tax rates but cannot apply different tax rates in a
given year to different vintages of capital.
On the Optimal Timing of Capital Taxes
John Hasslera,c†, Per Krusellb,a,c,d, Kjetil Storeslettenf,c, Fabrizio Zilibottig,c
Received November 1, 2006; Received in Revised Form October 25, 2007
Abstract
For many kinds of capital, depreciation rates change systematically with the age of the capital.
Consider an example that captures essential aspects of human capital, both regarding its accumu-
lation and its depreciation: a worker obtains knowledge in period 0, then uses this knowledge in
production in periods 1 and 2, and thereafter retires. Here, depreciation accelerates: it occurs at a
100% rate after period 2, and at a lower (perhaps zero) rate before that. The present paper ana-
lyzes the implications of non-constant depreciation rates for the optimal timing of taxes on capital
income. The main ﬁnding is that under natural assumptions, the path of tax rates over time must
be oscillatory. Oscillatory tax rates are optimal when depreciation rates accelerate with the age of
the capital (as in the above example), and provided that the government can commit to the path of
future tax rates but cannot apply diﬀerent tax rates in a given year to diﬀerent vintages of capital.
Keywords: Asset depreciation, Human capital, Optimal taxation, Oscillations, State-contingent taxes, Tax dynamics.
JEL classification: D90, E61, E62, H21, H30
∗We would like to thank Robert King, one anonymous referee, Katharina Greulich, Heng Chen, and
participants to many seminars and conferences for comments. Storesletten thanks the Norwegian Research
Council for ﬁnancial support.
†Corresponding author: John Hassler, IIES Stockholm University, 10691 Stockholm, Sweden. Telephone
number: +46 816-2070. Fax number: +46 816-1443. Email: john.hassler@iies.su.se
On the Optimal Timing of Capital Taxes 3
a Institute of International Economic Studies, Stockholm University; bPrinceton Univer-
sity; c CEPR; d CAERP; e NBER; f University of Oslo; gIEW University of Zurich;
On the Optimal Timing of Capital Taxes 3
1. Introduction
What is the optimal path of taxes for a benevolent government that needs to ﬁnance
some essential public expenditures? We study this question in a setting where taxation must
take the form of proportional levies on capital income and where depreciation rates may vary
over time (i.e., non-geometric depreciation). We are particularly interested in the case where
depreciation rates increase with the age of capital, since we believe that it captures a realistic
feature of the depreciation of physical and, in particular, human capital. For example, when
a worker leaves the workforce, large parts of her human capital depreciates. We ﬁnd that in
such economies, it is optimal for the government to commit (if it can) to an oscillating tax
sequence.
A standard principle in public ﬁnance is that taxation should be designed so as to keep
distortions smooth over time. This principle applies whenever the social cost of raising tax
revenue is convex, a circumstance that is met in most settings. In models where taxes only
distort static decisions (e.g., to labor supply), and where the relevant elasticities are constant
over time, this implies that taxes should be as close to constant as possible and that shocks
to expenditures should be absorbed by time-varying debt (see, e.g., Barro, 1979). However,
if taxes distort accumulation decisions, new issues arise, since such decisions depend not only
on a single tax rate but on the present value of taxes generated by each unit of investment.
One much studied question is how much tax revenue should be raised from income arising
from static decisions (say, labor income) and how much should be raised from taxing income
from accumulated production factors (such as physical capital). The seminal papers by
Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) in this area show, in particular, that optimal taxation in
general involves taxing both labor and capital but at very particular, time-varying rates: over
time, the tax rate on the accumulated factor should go to zero. Thus, they should be “front-
loaded” and, in a typical setting (see Atkeson et al., 1999), high only for a ﬁnite number
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of periods and thereafter zero forever. In this paper we emphasize that the smoothing of
distortions across vintages of investment does not, in general, imply the smoothing of tax
rates. Rather, under non-geometric depreciation, oscillations in tax rates can turn out to
be a way of smoothing distortions while also imposing higher present-value taxes on the
inelastic supply of initial capital and on capital installed early on.1
We consider a modiﬁed version of the standard neoclassical growth model. In addition
to a more generalized depreciation structure, we consider linear utility—in order to avoid
tax eﬀects on the interest rate—and a two-sector production structure.2 Consumption is
linear in the capital input (which could be human capital or physical capital) whereas the
production of investment involves decreasing returns. An important assumption for our
results is that at any point in time, all capital income has to be taxed at the same rate; i.e.,
the government cannot impose vintage-speciﬁc taxes. Moreover, the government cannot levy
taxes or subsidies on investments (see Section 5 for further discussion of these assumptions).
When depreciation is geometric, our model reproduces the standard result that taxes on
capital should be front-loaded. Suppose, as is standard in the literature, that the government
cannot tax capital income in period zero (which would be non distortionary). Then the
planner taxes capital income in period 1 at a very high rate so as to extract revenue from
the part of the initial tax base that is inelastic (i.e., from those assets that were accumulated
before the start of the planning horizon). Thereafter, the optimal tax rate drops to its steady-
state level. Though standard, an interesting aspect of this result is that the distortions on
asset accumulation generated by this tax sequence are far from smooth: the tax burden is
borne entirely by the investments in the ﬁrst period. This may seem surprising: shouldn’t the
1Strong time variation of tax rates is a characteristic of the optimal policy also in Greulich and Marcet
(2007). They emphasize that, while capital taxes are front-loaded, labor taxes have to be back-loaded to
encourage early capital accumulation. Moreover, Hagedorn (2007) emphasizes that in the presence of search
frictions, Ramsey problems can be non-convex and therefore generate optimal tax cycles. This mechanism
is, however, quite diﬀerence from the one we emphasize here.
2With linear utility the government will not try to manipulate the interest rate; see Lucas and Stokey
(1983).
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planner shift some burden to future investments, so as to smooth distortions? In addition,
after the ﬁrst period (with high taxation), since capital depreciates geometrically, there is
still inelastic capital left. Both these factors speak for a large tax rate in the second period.
However, the fact that the initial investment is heavily distorted by the ﬁrst-period tax makes
it very costly to distort it further by a high second-period tax rate. This speaks for lower
taxes in period two. It turns out that the opposing forces cancel exactly under geometric
depreciation, so that taxes go to their steady-state level immediately, although in our model
the steady-state capital-income tax is not zero for reasons that are related to the analysis of
Correia (1996).3,4
If, on the other hand, capital depreciates at a time-varying rate (changing with the age
of the capital), the planner can and will use the timing of taxation to smooth distortions.
To establish the result in a transparent way, we focus on a simple deviation from geometric
depreciation that we label “quasi-geometric”: the depreciation rate in the ﬁrst period is
allowed to be diﬀerent from that in subsequent periods. The presence of a distribution
of capital vintages turns the timing of taxation into an additional instrument for enabling
distortion smoothing. We stress the case in which the depreciation rate increases with the
age of the asset, since this seems empirically relevant for most types of capital (see below
for more discussion). In this case, the Ramsey allocation implies oscillatory tax dynamics.
The case of human capital illuminates this point. Suppose that the asset is accumulated
in period t − 1 and is fully productive in periods t and t + 1 but not thereafter. This is
a particular case of quasi-geometric depreciation, where the depreciation increases with the
asset age (depreciation is zero initially, and then 100%). At time t, a surprise occurs, which
3Intuitively, if the present-value tax revenue extracted from inelastic capital were held constant, then
shifting capital taxation to later dates would be detrimental: it would not reduce the burden on time-zero
investments, and it would distort future investment decisions unnecessarily.
4Here, as in Correia (1996), we assume that a production input (investment goods) cannot be taxed.
Absent this restriction on taxation, some long-run taxation of capital income will be optimal, since such
taxation would indirectly allow some taxation of the untaxed input.
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increases the need for the government to raise funds (e.g., a war).5 In this case, the planner
wants to seize the opportunity to extract a large amount of tax revenue from the generation
that made its investment before the war. This generation sunk its investment under the
expectation of lower taxes, and this investment is, at t and t + 1, an inelastic tax base,
calling for a high tax rate. The key insight is that this high tax rate can be counteracted by
a lower tax rate in t + 2 so that investments in period t are not too distorted. The revenue
from taxes paid by capital originating from investments done before the shock is not hurt
by the reduction in period t + 2 taxes, since it is fully depreciated by then. Then, since
the t + 2 tax rate is low, a higher t + 3 tax rate helps smooth investments, and so on. This
oscillating plan features a smoother path of distortions than full front-loading would. At the
same time, it allows the planner to exploit the lower elasticity of the tax base at t. This
example is simple and intuitive because the asset (human capital) is only productive for two
periods. However, we show that this intuition is robust to the case where assets are inﬁnitely
lived and depreciate smoothly but at rate that is increasing in the asset age.
In Section 2, we describe the basic setup from the perspective of standard Ramsey prob-
lems where the issue is that of how and when to ﬁnance an exogenous stream of government
expenditures when the government can borrow and lend. Section 3 derives our main results.
Section 4 introduces stochastic shocks to government spending needs. This extension shows
that, if government debt is not state contingent, optimal tax oscillations can arise after a
ﬁscal shock. Thus, the ﬂuctuations in our examples are not necessarily mere memories of
the initial-period capital stock. However, if debt is state-contingent, no new ﬂuctuations
occur: those that are present are indeed a memory of the initial period. Section 5 concludes.
The appendix contains some proofs and technical derivations. Some additional proofs are
5The assumption in this example—that the change is a “surprise”—is made for simplicity. It can be
interpreted as allowing the planner to make a commitment but then re-optimize after a zero-probability
shock realization. We show in Section 4 that the argument is robust to assuming that the shock is the
realization of a stochastic process of which agents know the probability distribution, and the government
commits, ex ante, to a state-contingent plan.
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contained in a technical appendix, available from the corresponding author’s webpage.
2. The model
In this section, we set up the basic model. We ﬁrst discuss the main maintained assump-
tion – the general structure of depreciation – and then describe the Ramsey problem facing
a benevolent planner who must ﬁnance an exogenous stream of expenditures.
2.1. Quasi-geometric human capital depreciation
The key new element we consider is variable depreciation rates of the stock of capital.
To ﬁx ideas, we will refer to human capital throughout, though we brieﬂy argue in Section
5 that also many kinds of physical capital share this depreciation structure. Thus, let us
subdivide the life of a unit of capital, which is now represented by a worker, into three stages:
youth, young adulthood, and old adulthood. The conditional probability of death increases
with age. More precisely, a young agent dies with probability zero, a young adult dies with
probability δρ and an old adult dies with probability δ, where δ ∈ (0, 1] and ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Moreover, each period young agents are born so that the size of the population is constant.
Youth and young adulthood last for at most one period: a surviving young agent turns into
a young adult, whereas a surviving young adult turns into an old adult. Only young agents
invest in human capital, e.g., through education. A unit of investment at time t leads to one
unit of productive capital in period t + 1. Thereafter, human capital does not depreciate
within the lifetime of an individual, but disappears when an agent dies.6 Thus, the expected
contribution to the future stock of human capital of a unit of investment at t is 1 unit in
period t+1, 1−ρδ units in period t+2, and (1−ρδ)(1−δ)k units in period t+2+k. We label
this structure quasi-geometric depreciation. Note that ρ = 1, i.e., a constant mortality rate
6In addition, one could assume that the human capital (knowledge) of an individual decreases with age
even conditionally on survival. This would yield the same qualitative dynamics of human capital depreciation
as the mortality channel discussed in the text.
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within the working population, yields a standard, geometric depreciation of human capital,
whereas ρ < 1, i.e., an increasing mortality rate within the working population, yields a
lower initial depreciation than in the geometric case. The case ρ = 0 and δ = 1, on the
other hand, describes the case where worker human capital survives for two periods without
depreciation and then disappears. Figure 1 represents a case of accelerating depreciation,
showing the fraction of investments made in period t− 1 that survives at t, t + 1, ..., etc.
< FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE >
In order to derive implications for the optimal taxation of human capital, we consider a
discrete-time, inﬁnite-horizon model where agents age and die according to the description
above. To abstract from mortality risk issues, which are orthogonal to our focus, we assume
agents to be part of “large families”. In particular, the economy is populated by a continuum
of representative unitary households, each consisting of a continuum of agents of diﬀerent
ages.7 The total size of the representative household is unity. The age distribution of each
household is constant over time. As above, an agent born in period t builds up it units
of human capital in the ﬁrst period of her life and becomes productive as of period t+1.
Thereafter, her human capital remains constant until her death.
The total stock of human capital of the household is the integral of the human capital
of all its members. Because of the age-dependent mortality rates, in order to determine the
total human capital of the household, it is necessary to distinguish between two kinds of
human capital at time t: the capital of the old adults, for which we use the notation hot ,
and that of the young adults, hyt . Clearly, h
y
t = it−1. The diﬀerence between these kinds of
capital is not in their productivities—the total human capital input of the household at t,
which we call ht, equals h
o
t + h
y
t—but in their depreciation rates from t to t + 1. Thus, our
7In our unitary households, all utilities will be interpreted from the perspective of perfect altruism across
generations: the representative agent is a “dynasty planner” who internalizes the eﬀects of current choices
on all future generations.
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assumptions are summarized by the following laws of motion for the two types of human
capital:
hot+1 = (1− δ)hot + (1− ρδ)it−1, (1)
hyt+1 = it.
These equations amount to a generalized version of the standard accumulation equation:
ht+1 = it + (1− δ)ht + δ(1− ρ)it−1. (2)
In this formulation, total human capital productive next period equals (i) the investment
made this period plus (ii) total capital in use this period depreciated at rate δ, with (iii)
an adjustment upward by δ(1 − ρ)it−1 due to the fact that not all capital in use today
actually depreciates at a constant rate δ: part of it, it−1, depreciates at the lower rate ρδ.8
Notice, in particular, that when ρ = 1 equation (2) reduces to the standard Blanchard-Yaari
perpetual youth model which yields geometric depreciation.. Much of the analysis below will
be conducted in terms of old capital, ho, since it is a natural state variable, whereas ht is
not.
A standard three-period model where agents invest in their youth and work for two peri-
ods can be viewed as a particular case of the general quasi-geometric depreciation structure
described above, where δ = 1. 9 In this case, ρ = 0 means that productivity is constant
throughout the life of an individual, whereas ρ > 0 would capture a downward-sloping age-
earnings proﬁle (the worker’s knowledge depreciates with age). We will focus on this simple
case in the analysis of stochastic shocks of Section 4.
8With ht− it−1 depreciating at rate δ and it−1 at rate ρδ, the new total capital in use becomes it +(ht−
it−1)(1− δ) + it−1(1− ρδ), which delivers the right-hand side of equation (2).
9Its counterpart in the literature on physical capital depreciation is a one-hoss shay depreciation structure,
where investment at t stays intact until t + 2 but then depreciates fully.
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2.2. Preferences and technology
Since our goal is to develop a tractable framework, we introduce two stark assumptions
about technology and preferences. First, we assume the intertemporal preferences of the
representative household to be time-additive and the intratemporal preferences to be linear
in consumption and quadratic in “educational eﬀort.”10 More formally,
U0 =
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ct − i2t
)
,
implying that the gross interest will be 1/β.11 Second, we assume that the production
function is linear in human capital. In particular, production at t is simply ht: it equals
total (old plus new) human capital. In this model, the issue is purely one of when income
should be taxed; there is no choice between taxing diﬀerent factors of production.12
The representative household chooses investment plans to maximize U0. The optimal
choice of investment must balance the marginal cost of investment (2it) and the expected
present discounted value (PDV) of the after-tax output generated by a marginal unit of
human capital. Since the marginal product of human capital is unity by assumption, this
value is given by
β (1− τ t+1) + (1− ρδ)
∞∑
s=2
βs (1− δ)s−2 (1− τ t+s) .
Deﬁning
κ ≡ β + (1− ρδ)
∞∑
s=2
βs (1− δ)s−2 = β 1 + βδ (1− ρ)
1− β (1− δ)
10¿From now on, all variables will be aggregated at the unitary household level. Note that, due to risk
neutrality, our formulation is identical to one in which there is no unitary household and the planner is
utilitarian, i.e., attaches the same weight to all living agents.
11It is possible to relax the assumption of quadratic investment costs and generalize it to any convex
cost. Then, one can provide a characterization of the dynamics around a steady state which is qualitatively
identical to the global solution we obtain.
12In spite of the linear technology, our model does not feature endogenous growth, due to the quadratic
investment cost.
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and
Tt ≡ βτ t+1 + (1− ρδ)
∞∑
s=2
βs (1− δ)s−2 τ t+s, (3)
it follows immediately that we can write the household’s optimal choice of investments in
the following compact way;
it = i (Tt) ≡ 1
2
(κ− Tt) (4)
where κ is the eﬀective duration of new investment and Tt is the the eﬀective discounted sum
of taxes (which we label the “present-value tax”) on period-t investments.
2.3. The Ramsey problem
The government must ﬁnance a given sequence {gt}∞t=0 of expenditures subject to an
intertemporal budget constraint
b0 +
∞∑
t=0
βt(gt − τ t(hot + it−1)) ≤ 0, (5)
where pre-tax output equals ht = h
o
t + it−1 and b0 is initial government debt. Note that
the only instrument available to the government is taxation of the return to human capital,
which coincides here with output taxation.
The Ramsey problem can now be formulated as a planner choosing a tax sequence max-
imizing the representative household’s utility subject to its budget constraint (5), and the
restriction that the allocation be a competitive equilibrium. Due to risk neutrality, maxi-
mizing total utility of the representative household is equivalent to maximizing the PDV of
after-tax output minus investment costs. Therefore, the Ramsey problem amounts to
max
{τ t,it,hot+1}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
(hot + it−1) (1− τ t)− i2t
)
,
subject to the budget constraint, (5), the law of motion of (old) capital under quasi-geometric
depreciation, (1), and the implementability constraint, (4). In addition, we impose that tax
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rates are bounded and that τ 0 = 0.
13
Before turning to the analysis, it is useful to relate our model to existing results in the
optimal capital taxation literature. First, using a model with geometric capital depreciation
and a linear (as opposed to quadratic) investment cost, Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985)
established that if the Ramsey tax sequence converges to a steady state, then the steady
state must be zero.14 However, the Chamley-Judd result does not apply to our model even
in the particular case of geometric depreciation. In fact, we will show later that our model
features positive taxation in the long run, due to the quadratic investment costs. This result,
which is not the main focus of our analysis, is a particular case of the more general analysis
by Correia (1996).15
3. Analysis
Deﬁne λ as the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the government budget constraint.
The Lagrange method then implies that the Ramsey problem can be expressed, after rear-
ranging terms, as:
max
{τ t,it,hot+1}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt((τ t (λ− 1) + 1)(hot + it−1)− i2t )− λ
(
b0 +
∞∑
t=0
βtgt
)
. (6)
The solution to the problem in (6) depends on the Lagrangian multiplier, λ. The value
of λ is determined by minimizing the objective in (6). It represents the shadow value of
the government’s budget constraint, (5), and is increasing in the government’s needs to
13The tax τ0 would be lump-sum as it is levied on predetermined human capital only. Therefore, if τ0
were a choice variable, it would be set at its maximum feasible level, with no eﬀect on any other choice.
Hence, setting τ0 = 0 is without loss of generality.
14In the analysis of Chamley and Judd, the planner can tax both labor and capital. However, this is not
important for the current discussion. Moreover, Atkeson et al. (1999) show that, under CRRA utility, the
Ramsey solution features zero capital taxation for all t ≥ 2.
15Correia’s main insight is that untaxed input factors provide one channel through which capital taxation
can be used beneﬁcially, even in the long run. In our framework, the human-capital investment is a non-
taxable household activity, subject to increasing marginal cost. There are therefore untaxed “proﬁts” in this
operation, which are equivalent to the untaxed factor income in Correia’s analysis.
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raise funds
(
b0 +
∑∞
t=0 β
tgt
)
and decreasing in hot + it−1. In the rest of the paper, we will
characterize the optimal sequence of taxes conditional on λ, bearing in mind that conditioning
on λ is equivalent to conditioning on a set of initial conditions.16
The following Lemma is a useful step towards characterizing the solution to the Ramsey
problem (the proof is simple algebra and is, therefore, omitted).
Lemma 1 Setting τ 0 = 0, the Ramsey problem, (6), subject to (1) and (4) is equivalent to
the following program:
max
{τ t}∞t=0
(λ− 1)
(
τ 0 (h
o
0 + i−1) + Tˆ0h
o
1
)
+
∞∑
t=0
βty (Tt)− λ(b0 +
∞∑
t=0
βtgt), (7)
where
Tˆ0 ≡ β
∞∑
t=0
(β(1− δ))t τ t+1, (8)
y(Tt) ≡ λκi (Tt)− i (Tt)2 (2λ− 1) , (9)
and Tt and i (Tt) are deﬁned as in (3) and (4), respectively.
The new functions y (Tt) and Tˆ0 will be particularly useful in the analysis below. The
function y (Tt) is the contribution of the human-capital investment of generation t to the
planner’s discounted utility. Each such “vintage” investment contributes to the planner’s
utility via private consumption, it (κ− Tt), the ﬁnancing of government expenditure, λTtit,
and the investment cost, −i2t . By using (4) to eliminate Tt, expression (9) follows imme-
diately. Furthermore, Tˆ0 is the eﬀective discounted sum of taxes levied on human capital
investments made before the beginning of the planning horizon, and thus inelastic. With
analogy to previous deﬁnitions, we label it the “present-value tax on inelastic capital”. Taxes
16The Ramsey problem above admits an alternative interpretation whereby households derive utility from
both private consumption and the consumption of a public good. The intratemporal utility is modiﬁed to
u(c, g, i) = c + λg − i2, where λ in this case denotes the constant marginal utility agents derive from the
consumption of the public good, and government revenue is entirely spent on the public good. See the
working paper version of the present paper, Hassler et al. (2004), for details.
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entering Tˆ0 are discounted at the rate β(1− δ), reﬂecting the discount factor and the rate of
depreciation of the initial human capital.
The objective function (7) is then the sum of the PDV of the contribution to the planner’s
utility of all investments from time zero onwards,
∑∞
t=0 β
ty (Tt), and the PDV of the tax
revenue from pre-existing human capital. Ignoring irrelevant constants and predetermined
variables and recalling that we rule out lump-sum taxes (τ 0 = 0), the Ramsey problem
simpliﬁes to
max
{Tˆ0,Tt}∞t=0
(λ− 1)Tˆ0ho1 +
∞∑
t=0
βty (Tt) , (10)
where
Tˆ0 =
∞∑
t=0
(−δβ (1− ρ))t Tt. (11)
Expression (11) follows from equations (3) and (8) and is formally derived in the appendix.
This expression implies that Tˆ0 cannot be chosen independently of the Tts. Note that h
o
1 is
a key predetermined variable; its size will inﬂuence the dynamics of present-value taxes.
The program (10) pins down the optimal sequence {Tt}∞t=0s and Tˆ0 rather than the
tax sequence {τ t}∞t=1. Since it = (κ− Tt) /2, this amounts to the planner choosing the
investment sequence. Thus, (10) is a primal formulation, where the planner chooses an
allocation directly, subject to the constraint that it is a competitive equilibrium. In the
appendix, we prove formally that there is a one-to-one mapping between the primal and the
dual formulations. Namely, a sequence of present-value tax rates (or investments) pins down
uniquely a sequence of individual tax rates satisfying (3) and (8).17
17Intuitively, because tax rates are bounded and β(1− δ) < 1, the present-value taxes must be bounded as
well. Forward iterating on equation (3) leads to Tt+1 = β−1(1− δ)−1 (Tt − βτ t+1). This diﬀerence equation
can be solved for a unique feasible sequence of tax rates. Namely, given a sequence {Tt}∞t=0, one can back
out a unique sequence of tax rates {τ t}∞t=1 which satisﬁes the boundedness condition. See Proposition 2
below and its proof in the appendix.
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3.1. The case of geometric depreciation
We ﬁrst analyze the benchmark case of constant mortality rate of the adult population,
i.e., geometric depreciation (ρ = 1). In this case all the present-value taxes are geometric (as
opposed to quasi-geometric) sums of future tax rates. In particular, Tˆ0 = T0: the present-
value tax on inelastic capital is identical to the present-value tax on investment in period
zero, which is distortionary. Thus, we can rewrite the Ramsey problem of equation (10) as
max
{Tt}∞t=0
(λ− 1)T0ho1 +
∞∑
t=0
βty (Tt) .
Expression (11), which is formally derived in the appendix and follows from equations
(3) and (8), implies that Tˆ0 cannot be chosen independently of the Tts. Note that h
o
1 is a
key predetermined variable; its size will inﬂuence the dynamics of present-value taxes.
The program (10) pins down the optimal sequence {Tt}∞t=1s and Tˆ0 rather than the tax
sequence {τ t}∞t=1. Since it = (κ− Tt) /2, this amounts to say that the planner chooses the
investment sequence. Thus, (10) is a primal formulation, where the planner chooses an
allocation directly, subject to the constraint that it is a competitive equilibrium. In the
appendix, we prove formally that there is a one-to-one mapping between the primal and the
dual formulation. Namely, a sequence of present-value tax rates (or investments) pins down
uniquely a sequence of individual tax rates satisfying (3) and (8).18
In period zero, the problem is diﬀerent: here T0, which distorts i0, also raises revenue
from the taxation of the inelastic human capital, ho1. Thus, the optimal T0, which we label
T ∗0 , satisﬁes
(λ− 1)ho1 + y′(T ∗0 ) = 0.
18Intuitively, because tax rates are bounded and β(1− δ) < 1, the present-value taxes must be bounded as
well. Forward iterating on equation (3) leads to Tt+1 = β−1(1− δ)−1 (Tt − βτ t+1). This diﬀerence equation
can be solved for a unique feasible sequence of tax rates. Namely, given a sequence {Tt}∞t=0, one can back
out a unique sequence of tax rates {τ t}∞t=1 which satisﬁes the boundedness condition. See Proposition 2
below and its proof in the appendix.
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Clearly, T ∗0 > T
∗ which in turn implies that τ 1 > τ ∗. The extent of the initial tax hike
depends positively on ho1.
3.2. Quasi-geometric depreciation
In the general case with an increasing mortality rate (quasi-geometric human-capital
depreciation), Tˆ0 is no longer equal to T0. Since the inelastic capital, h
o
1, depreciates at a
diﬀerent rate from new investments, the timing of taxes can be used to improve eﬃciency.
Now, the connection between Tˆ0 and the sequence of Tts in equation (11) is key for un-
derstanding the oscillatory tax dynamics: if ρ < 1, the weights on the future present-value
taxes Tt have alternate signs. Thus, every Tt will inﬂuence the taxation of inelastic capital,
and whether Tt increases or decreases the present-value tax on inelastic capital depends on
whether t is even or odd.
After eliminating Tˆ0, using (11), from (10), the Ramsey problem now reads
max
{Tt}∞t=1
(λ− 1)
( ∞∑
t=0
(−δβ (1− ρ))t Tt
)
ho1 +
∞∑
t=0
βty (Tt) .
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to Tt is
(λ− 1)ho1 (−δ (1− ρ))t + y′ (Tt) = 0. (12)
The set of FOCs for t ≥ 0 pins down uniquely the optimal present-value tax sequence {Tt}∞t=1
and, hence, the optimal tax sequence {τ t}∞t=1 (see the proof of Proposition 2). Note that the
ﬁrst-order condition for T0 is the same as in the case of geometric depreciation. However,
under geometric depreciation ho1 only aﬀects future present-value taxes via its eﬀect on
the Lagrange multiplier, λ. In contrast, under quasi-geometric depreciation ho1 also aﬀects
directly the dynamics of the entire sequence of investments and taxes, as shown by equation
(12). The solution can be summarized by our main proposition.19
19The assumption that b0+
∑∞
t=0 β
tgt is not too large is meant to avoid uninteresting complications arising
from corner solutions in the choice of taxes.
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Proposition 2 Assume that ‖δ (1− ρ)‖ ≤ 1 and that b0+
∑∞
t=0 β
tgt is not too large. Then,
the optimal (Ramsey) present-value tax sequence is given by
Tt =
λ− 1
2λ− 1
(
κ + 2ho1 (−δ (1− ρ))t
)
for t ≥ 0. (13)
The corresponding unique tax sequence that implements the Ramsey allocation is:
τ t+1 = τ
∗ − δ (1− ρ) (τ t − τ ∗) for t ≥ 1, (14)
τ 1 = τ
∗
(
1 + 2ho1
1 + βδ (1− δ) (1− ρ)
β
(
1− βδ2 (1− ρ)2)
)
, (15)
where τ ∗ ≡ (λ− 1) / (2λ− 1) < 1/2, and λ guarantees that equation (5) is satisﬁed with
equality, given the investment rule (4), the deﬁnition of Tt in (3), and the optimal tax
sequence deﬁned by (14)-(15). If δ (1− ρ) = 0, then the tax sequence is constant after the
ﬁrst period. If δ (1− ρ) ∈ (0, 1), then the tax sequence converges in an oscillatory fashion to
τ ∗. If δ (1− ρ) = 1, then the optimal tax sequence is a two-period cycle.
Proof (sketch): The ﬁrst-order condition (12), together with the deﬁnition of y(Tt) as
given in (9), yield the optimal present-value tax sequence, (13). The proof in the appendix
amounts to showing that the tax sequence (14)-(15) is the unique sequence satisfying (13)
and the tax constraint τ t ≤ 1, given the deﬁnition of the Tt’s as in (3).
Figure 2 shows the dynamics of tax rates (τ t), present-value taxes (Tt), investments and
net output, deﬁned as hot + it−1 − i2t , in a case of quasi-geometric depreciation. Note that
investments ﬂuctuate less than taxes, an illustration of the fact that although taxes may
ﬂuctuate a lot over time, investments and distortions are smoother. Net output ﬂuctuates
around a geometric trend toward the steady state.20
< FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE >
20However, gross output, excluding investment costs, i.e., hot + it−1, displays monotone convergence and
is, in fact, constant in the case of δ = 1. The proof and details about the calibration are in the technical
appendix, available from the corresponding author’s webpage.
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3.3. Interpretation
3.3.1. A second-best benchmark: age-specific taxation
In order to understand the results of the previous section, it is useful to compare them
with the case in which the planner has access to age-speciﬁc taxation, i.e., she can tax the
income produced by diﬀerent cohorts at diﬀerent rates. The Ramsey sequence is then very
simple: the planner taxes the human capital income of the initially old adults, ho1, at the
highest possible rate every period, since these taxes are non-distortionary. All cohorts after
period zero are then taxed at the constant rate τ ∗ such that y′ (Ts) = 0 for all s > 0, where
Ts = T
∗ ≡ β (1− β(1− δ))−1 τ ∗. We will refer to this benchmark allocation as second best.
This allocation achieves a perfectly smooth distortion of investments by smoothing perfectly
the taxes aﬀecting future investment vintages.
In contrast, when age-speciﬁc taxes are ruled out, the planner cannot separate taxation of
output produced by inelastic human capital from distortionary taxation on output produced
by later human-capital vintages.21 Thus, a trade oﬀ arises between the objective of smoothing
distortions and that of taxing inelastic human capital. Note, that the Ramsey tax sequence
of Proposition 2 features perfect tax and investment smoothing only when ho1 = 0: when
there is no inelastic capital, the planner chooses constant taxes as she would do in the second
best.
3.3.2. Geometric depreciation (ρ = 1)
In the case of geometric depreciation, there are no oscillations, and taxes are smooth
after one period. Investments, however, are far from smooth. In particular, since τ 1 > τ
∗,
while τ t = τ
∗ for all t > 1, all distortions generated to extract income from the inelastic
capital are borne by the ﬁrst cohort of young agents (T0 > Tt = T
∗, for all t > 0). This
21Hassler et al. (2007) analyzes the properties of the Ramsey allocation in a two-period version of this
model when age-dependent taxation is allowed.
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implies very low investments in period zero. Why does the planner not attempt to smooth
distortions by taxing capital at later dates, thus reducing τ 1 so as to increase i0?
First, given the present-value tax on inelastic capital, Tˆ0, it is impossible for the planner
to use the timing of taxes to alleviate distortions on period-zero investments. This follows
immediately from the fact that Tˆ0 = T0. For instance, if the planner were to reduce τ 1 and
increase τ 2 so as to keep Tˆ0 constant, investment in period zero would not change. Second,
such tax reallocation would increase T1 and distort it away from the second best level, T
∗.
The same argument applies to any other potential changes in the timing of taxation (e.g.,
the same experiment using τ 3 instead of τ 2 would increase both T1 and T2). In sum, it is
optimal for the planner to “front-load” taxes in order not to distort investments after the
ﬁrst period.
Our results imply that taxes for periods t > 1 only depend on ho1 via its eﬀect on λ (a
larger ho1 increases the tax revenue all else equal, relaxing the government budget constraint,
and implying lower λ and lower τ ∗). To understand this result, note that along the optimal
path, the marginal distortion of τ s must be proportional to the marginal revenue generated
by that tax. If ho1 is increased, the marginal revenue raised by τ 1 increases, so τ 1 should
then be increased, increasing the distortion on period zero investments i0. What are the
implications for the optimal choice of τ 2? The trade-oﬀ between distortions and revenue
generation for τ 2 is aﬀected in two ways. First, as for τ 1, the higher h
o
1 aﬀects the marginal
revenue of τ 2 positively. Second, however, the higher distortion on period-zero investments
increases the marginal distortionary cost of τ 2 since this tax aﬀects i0 (in addition to aﬀecting
i1). Under geometric depreciation, these two eﬀects exactly balance each other out and the
increase in τ 1 caused by a higher h
o
1 should not lead to any changes in τ 2 or, more generally,
in any subsequent tax rates.
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3.3.3. Quasi-geometric depreciation
We now move to the general case, where ρ < 1. According to Proposition 2, the Ramsey
tax sequence is oscillating when ρ ∈ [0, 1). We refer to this case as accelerating depreciation,
since capital depreciates less in the ﬁrst period than afterwards. In order to understand why
oscillations arise, it is useful to start from a particular case.
A particular case: δ = 1 The case of δ = 1 has a feature that makes the analysis
particularly intuitive: τ 1 is the only instrument the planner has available for taxing the
inelastic capital. Taxes at later dates do not extract revenue from ho1, since this will have
depreciated fully. Why, then, not set τ t = τ
∗ for t > 1, instead of producing an oscillating
sequence after the initial tax hike? The reason is that, unlike in the case of geometric
depreciation, the planner can now use the timing of taxes to smooth future distortions.
Recall that, while an initial tax hike is attractive since it generates revenue from an inelastic
base, it also distorts investments in period zero, i0 (as in the case of geometric depreciation,
the magnitude of such hike is increasing in the inelastic capital). These distortions can be
mitigated, because investment decisions depend on both τ 1 and τ 2 (recall that, when δ = 1,
we have Tt = τ t+1 + β (1− ρ) τ t+2). Thus, the planner can alleviate the distortion on period
zero investments by promising a low tax rate in period two. In turn, the low tax rate in
period two stimulates investments in period one, and since it is optimal to keep distortions
smooth, it is therefore useful to compensate the tax break in period two by another tax hike
in period three, and so on.
In contrast to the case of geometric depreciation, taxes at dates t > 1 are now aﬀected by
the size of the stock of inelastic capital, ho1. To understand this, note that when h
o
1 is higher,
it is optimal to increase τ 1 (relative to future taxes). This increases the marginal distortion
of τ 2 because i0 is already distorted by a high τ 1. Moreover, τ 2 does not extract revenue
from ho1 since it is fully depreciated by period t = 2. Thus, it is optimal to reduce τ 2.
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The parameter ρ is key for the size of the oscillations. Consider for instance the extreme
case when ρ = 0: the one-hoss shay case. As Proposition 2 shows, in this case oscillations
do not die out: the economy ends up in a two-period cycle. The reason is that the increase
in the distortion entailed by τ 2 on i0 is particularly large since i0 has not depreciated at
all by period t = 2. Equivalently, the eﬀectiveness of counteracting a current tax hike by a
next-period tax break is high. When ρ > 0, a larger share of the return on the investment
is accrued in the ﬁrst period of life than in the second. Therefore, reducing τ 2 will be a
less eﬀective instrument for counteracting distortions in period zero. Hence, oscillations are
smaller and die out in the long run.
The general case with accelerating depreciation We now turn to the general case
of accelerating quasi-geometric depreciation: ρ ∈ [0, 1) and δ ∈ (0, 1). As under geomet-
ric depreciation, human capital is never completely depleted, and the present-value tax on
inelastic capital, Tˆ0, depends on the entire tax sequence. However, unlike in the case of
geometric depreciation, the Ramsey tax sequence follows an oscillatory pattern. The general
point is that since Tˆ0 = T0, it is possible to use the timing of taxes to alter T0 while leaving
Tˆ0 unchanged. For instance, if we decrease τ 2 and increase τ 1 so as to keep Tˆ0 constant,
T0 will decrease, since taxes from period two and onwards have a larger impact on T0 than
on Tˆ0.
22 The planner can now use the timing of taxation as an imperfect substitute for the
absence of age-speciﬁc taxes and achieve better distortion smoothing. Recall, in particular,
that the hike in τ 1 distorts heavily i0. Thus, distortion smoothing makes it desirable for the
planner to use future taxes to reduce T0. This is achieved by setting τ 2 < τ
∗ (as in the δ = 1
case). However, having done this, it is not optimal to set τ t = τ
∗ for t > 2, because such a
sequence would imply a deviation from the second-best benchmark in the direction of too
large investments in period one (T1 < T
∗), while all future investment levels would be set at
22The particular case of δ = 1 provides an extreme example: by keeping τ1 constant and reducing τ2, one
can decrease T0 while keeping Tˆ0 constant.
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the second-best level. Again, distortion smoothing suggests an increase in τ 3 so as to reduce
i1, and so on.
4. Stochastic government expenditure
Proposition 2 establishes conditions under which ﬂuctuations in taxes and output are
eﬃcient. However, if ho1 = 0 (i.e., no pre-installed capital at time zero), the optimal tax
sequence is smooth; that is, the optimal tax oscillations implied by the model can be entirely
traced back to an initial condition. The aim of this section is to show that when future
expenditure needs are stochastic and markets are incomplete (no state-contingent debt can
be issued), then the transitional dynamics of the optimal tax sequence feature oscillations
even if there is no inelastic capital to begin with. However, if the government can issue
state-contingent debt, no oscillations arise.
For simplicity, government-expenditure risk is limited to a one-time event only. More
precisely, as of period 1 it is revealed whether spending requirements will be high (state
h) or low (state l). However, in period zero the state is unknown, and p ∈ (0, 1) denotes
the probability that the state will be high. Again, for simplicity we focus on the case δ =
1, i.e., the standard overlapping-generations case with no intergenerational human capital
transmission, and assume that i−1 = 0.
4.1. Incomplete markets
In this section, we assume that the government cannot issue state-contingent debt. How-
ever, the government can set, with full commitment, state-contingent taxes sequences, except
for τ 1. An interpretation of this assumption is that τ 1, as well as all other tax rates, must
be set one period in advance: there is an “implementation lag” of one period, implying that
the tax rate in period one cannot depend on information revealed in period one, whereas the
On the Optimal Timing of Capital Taxes 23
subsequent taxes can depend on that information. Thus, at time zero, the planner sets τ 1
and a state-contingent tax plan, {τ j,t, τ j,t}∞t=2 for j ∈ {l, h}. When the ﬁrst-period invest-
ment, i0, is chosen, only τ 1 is known with certainty, whereas agents do not know whether
the tax rate will be τh,2 or τ l,2 in period two. In contrast, all subsequent generations of
investments (including i1) are made under perfect information.
When uncertainty has unraveled, the sequence {τh,t}∞t=2 is implemented if spending re-
quirements are high, whereas the sequence {τ l,t}∞t=2 is implemented if these are low. The tax
sequences must now satisfy one government budget constraint for each state j ∈ {l, h}:
b0 + g0 +
∞∑
t=1
βtgj,t ≡ Gj = βτ 1i0 +
∞∑
t=2
βt(τ j,t(h
o
j,t + ij,t−1)), (16)
where hoj,t and ij,t denote equilibrium stocks of old and new capital in state j at time t.
The Lagrange multipliers of the two budget constraints are denoted by λh and λl. Clearly,
Gh > Gl > 0 implies λh > λl > 0.
23
We extend the deﬁnition (9) to the stochastic case:
yj (T ) ≡ λjκi (T )− i (T )2 (2λj − 1) . (17)
Thus, yj (Tj,t) will be the realized contribution to the planner’s utility of the human-capital
investment of the generation born in period t ≥ 1, conditional on state j ∈ {l, h} and on
the realized present-value tax Tj,t. The analysis of the investment of the generation born in
period zero necessitates some new notation, as such
The investment i0 is made under uncertainty and requires some new notation. We denote
by
ye0 (Tl,0, Th,0) ≡
[
i (T e0 ) (κ− T e0 )− i (T e0 )2
]
+ (1− p)λli (T e0 )Tl,0 + pλhi (T e0 )Th,0 (18)
23As above, we do not solve explicitly for λj as a function of Gj . However, we note that the optimal
steady-state tax rate corresponding to a a particular value of λj is given by τ∗j = (λj − 1) / (2λj − 1).
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the expected contribution to the planner’s utility of the generation born at zero. The expected
(as opposed to realized) period-zero present-value tax is denoted:
T e0 ≡ pTh,0 + (1− p)Tl,0, (19)
where, again, Tl,0, Th,0 are the realized present-value taxes on period-zero investments in the
two states. Due to certainty equivalence, i0 is fully determined by T
e
0 . The right-hand side of
equation (18) consists of two terms: the certainty equivalent utility from private consumption
(in square brackets) and the expected value for the planner of the tax revenue levied on the
investments of the generation born at zero.
The Ramsey plan can be formulated as
max
{τ1,Th,t,Tl,t}∞t=0
ye0 (T
e
0 , Tl,0, Th,0) +
∞∑
t=1
βt (p · yh (Th,t) + (1− p) · yl (Tl,t)) , (20)
subject to (17), (18), (19), and the constraints that, for j ∈ {l, h},
Tj,0 = βτ 1 + β (1− ρ)
∞∑
t=0
(−β (1− ρ))t Tj,t+1, (21)
which generalize equation (11).24
Here, we summarize the results. The details of the analytical derivations are provided in
the technical appendix available from the corresponding author’s webpage. Substituting the
constraints (19) and (21) into (20), T e0 , Tl,0 and Th,0 can be eliminated from the objective
function. The Ramsey program can then be formulated as an unconstrained maximization
24The expression in (21) is derived from the deﬁnition Tj,t ≡ βτ j,t+1 + (1− ρ)β2τ j,t+2, which implies
Tj,t−1 − βτ j,t = β (1− ρ)Tj,t − β (1− ρ) (Tj,t − βτ j,t+1) .
Forward substitution gives
Tj,t−1 − βτ j,t = β (1− ρ)
∞∑
s=0
(−β (1− ρ))s Tj,t+s
−β (1− ρ) lim
T→∞
(−β (1− ρ))T (Tj,t+T − βτ t+T+1) ,
where the last term is zero.
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problem with choice variables τ 1 and {Th,t, Tl,t}∞t=1 . The ﬁrst-order conditions for this prob-
lem imply a linear system of equations yielding unique solutions for τ 1, Th,0, and Tl,0 (with
Th,0 > Tl,0) in terms of primitives and the shadow values of the two budget constraints, λh
and λl. The the sequences of present-value taxes, {Th,t, Tl,t}∞t=1, can be shown to satisfy
Th,t − T ∗h = −
(
T ∗h − T e0 +
λh − λl
2λh − 1 (1− p)Tl,0
)
(− (1− ρ))t , (22)
Tl,t − T ∗l = −
(
T ∗l − T e0 −
λh − λl
2λl − 1pTh,0
)
(− (1− ρ))t . (23)
Clearly, if 0 < ρ < 1, the sequences {Th,t, Tl,t}∞t=1 converge in an oscillatoryfashion
to their respective limits T ∗h and T
∗
l , where T
∗
j ≡ κ (λj − 1) / (2λj − 1) for j ∈ {h, l}. If
ρ = 1 oscillations do not die out. The diﬀerence equations (22)-(23) and τ 1 provide a
complete characterization of the optimal state-contingent present-value taxes. Given τ 1 and
{Th,t, Tl,t}∞t=1, the tax sequences {τ j,t}∞t=2 can be backed out using (recursively) the expression;
τ j,t+1 =
Tj,t−1 − βτ j,t
β2 (1− ρ) ,
where τh,1 = τ l,1 = τ 1. This yields
τ j,t+1 = τ
∗
j − (1− ρ)
(
τ j,t − τ ∗j
)
, t ≥ 2, (24)
where τ ∗h ≡ (λh − 1) / (2λh − 1) and τ ∗l ≡ (λl − 1) / (2λl − 1).
Figure 3 shows a numerical example. The upper panel shows that present-value taxes
(Tj,t), and thus investments, oscillate in both states of nature. The right panel shows the
actual tax sequence that implements the optimal allocation. Tax oscillations arise in both
states of nature, even though there is no inelastic capital. Had the state of nature been
known in advance, the planner would have chosen a constant sequence τ ∗h = 1/3 in the
high-spending state and τ ∗l = 0.3 in the low-spending state, respectively. However, due to
uncertainty, τ 1 must be set at a level producing an intermediate investment level in period
zero. In fact, T e0 = 0.397 and is thus in between the two steady-state levels of present-value
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taxes (0.419 and 0.377, respectively). If the high-spending state is realized, the planner
sets τh,2 > τ
∗
h. The reason is twofold: ﬁrst, the government faces larger spending needs than
expected; second, taxes have turned out to be lower than what agents born in period zero had
expected and based their investment upon. In other words, i0 is higher than the steady-state
investments under large ﬁnancing needs. Then, distortion smoothing requires this generation
to be taxed more heavily in the second period. In contrast, if the low state is realized, the
planner sets τ l,2 < τ
∗
l and the mirror image of the argument a\above applies. From period
three and onwards, taxes continue to oscillate following the dynamics characterized in the
deterministic case of Proposition 2. For instance, the high (low) τh,2 (τ l,2) tends to distort the
investment of the generation born in time one heavily (lightly). Thus, distortion smoothing
requires a high (low) τh,3 (τ l,3), and so on.
< FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE >
4.2. Complete markets
The results in the previous subsection can be compared with those in an environment of
complete markets, where there exist markets for state-contingent assets paying one unit of the
consumption good conditionally on the realization of the high-spending or the low-spending
state. Let period-one consumption be the nume´raire and deﬁne qj,t as the Arrow-Debreu
price of the consumption good in period t and state j. The assumption of a one-period
implementation lag in taxes is maintained. The two government budget constraints given
by (16) can now be consolidated into one constraint:
b0 + g0 +
∞∑
t=1
∑
j∈{h,l}
qj,tgj,t+1 = βτ 1i0 +
∞∑
t=1
∑
j∈{h,l}
qj,tτ j,t+1
(
τ j,t+1(h
o
j,t+1 + ij,t)
)
. (25)
Since individual utility is linear in consumption, it follows that the Arrow-Debreu prices
must be given by the discounted probabilities, i.e., that qh,t = β
tp and ql,t = β
t(1 − p).
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Hence,
b0 + g0 +
∞∑
t=1
βt
(
get+1 − τ et+1
(
τ et+1(h
o,e
t+1 + i
e
t)
))
= 0, (26)
where variables with superscript e denote expected values: xe ≡ pxh+(1− p)xl. Since there
is only one budget constraint, the Ramsey plan simpliﬁes to
max
{Tt}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βtyCM (Tt) =
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
λCMκi (Tt)− i (Tt)2 (2λCM − 1)
)
,
where λCM denotes the multiplier associated with the complete-market budget constraint
(26). Clearly, the solution features y′CM (Tt) = 0 for all t, namely, constant present-value
taxes and investment.
Intuitively, under complete markets the government can achieve perfect distortion smooth-
ing by letting private agents bear all the spending risk. The resulting allocation is identical
to one where the government eﬃciently collects just enough resources to satisfy its spending
needs in expectation and then uses lump-sum taxes to cover additional needs in the high-
spending state and to rebate the surplus to the private agents in the low-spending state. Note
that the assumption of risk-neutrality ensures that agents are prepared to own a portfolio of
state-contingent debt that makes them act as insurers of the government.
5. Final remarks
We have shown, using a modiﬁed neoclassical growth model, that a benevolent govern-
ment can ﬁnd it optimal to make the sequence of capital income tax rates oscillatory in order
to ﬁnance a given stream of expenditures at a minimal cost to consumers. Three assumptions
underlie this result. First, depreciation rates for capital are increasing in age, as opposed to
constant. Second, the government cannot apply diﬀerent tax rates to income from diﬀerent
vintages of capital. Third, the government has commitment to set future tax rates. We now
make brief comments on each of these assumptions.
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Our main argument rests on the assumption that depreciation rates increase as capital
ages. We do believe that this captures essential features of the evolution of human capital:
it tends to “die” with worker retirement, as well as to some extent when workers switch
tasks (to the extent that human capital is task-speciﬁc). There is also substantial empirical
evidence that the depreciation rate of many physical assets is increasing with age. A seminal
study by Coen (1975) estimates capacity depreciation for equipment and structures in 21
industries and ﬁnds a predominant pattern of depreciation increasing with age. In many
cases, capital depreciation is found to be of the one-hoss shay variety, i.e., capital maintains
its full capacity until when it is scrapped. Similar results are obtained by Penson et al.
(1977) and by Pakes and Griliches (1984), who ﬁnd that the productive value of investments
is actually increasing over the ﬁrst three years and remains constant for the following four
to ﬁve years. The evidence for increasing depreciation rates is particularly sharp in the case
of IT technologies (see e.g. Whelan (2002), Geske, Ramey, and Shapiro (2003), and Dunn
et al. (2004)).25
If the government could apply vintage-speciﬁc tax rates, the taxation problem would
become trivial: the planner could expropriate pre-installed capital and attain perfect distor-
tion smoothing on new investments. Such a conclusion follows independently of the depre-
ciation structure. In particular, taxation in the standard Chamley-Judd framework would
not feature any dynamics either.26 The motivation for ruling out vintage-speciﬁc taxation
by assumption is that we believe that it is diﬃcult in practice to distinguish when existing
25In contrast, studies based on second-hand asset prices argue that geometric decay is a good model of
economic depreciation (see Hulten and Wykoﬀ, 1981). We believe, however, that the price of second-hand
capital is a poor proxy for the internal productive capacity of installed capital (which is the relevant notion
for our analysis), since this is aﬀected by private information and adverse-selection issues. Moreover, there
is some variation in results across studies using second-hand prices. For example, Oliner (1996) ﬁnds that
economic depreciation for machine tools is signiﬁcantly increasing with age.
26In this case, all revenue generated by pre-installed capital could always be fully captured by the govern-
ment. Thus, in every period the government would have a separate tax rate for that income which originates
in investment prior to period zero. This rate could be bounded at any point in time, but taxation of the
initial base for capital income would then continue until it is exhausted.
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capital was built. For human capital, the timing of education is observable, but the timing
of later investments in human capital (on and oﬀ the job), and their importance relative to
educational investments, are for the most part not observed. For physical capital, though
initial investment amounts might be measured by tax authorities, later adjustments in the
form of maintenance and upgrades are diﬃcult to assess. Moreover, a feature of many forms
of investments is that they have a consumption component. This is obvious for the case of
education, but it is arguably the case also for many other investment activities. Thus, with
substantial investment subsidies, the diﬃculty for ﬁscal authorities of sorting out the con-
sumption component from true productive investments arguably make such subsidies quite
imperfect tools. A more thorough treatment relying explicitly on information asymmetries
would be an interesting extension to the present work.27
Finally, what if the government could not commit to its future tax rates? Then taxes
would indeed be set diﬀerently, unless one could invoke reputational mechanisms: the com-
mitment equilibrium is time inconsistent, for reasons standard to capital taxation problems.
In a working paper version of the this paper, we show that the lack of commitment implies
a natural tendency for taxes not to ﬂuctuate or, at least, to ﬂuctuate less (see also Hassler
et al., 2005, for a similar result with a politico-economic interpretation). When there is no
commitment or commitment is imperfect (as in Debortoli and Nunes, 2006), the govern-
ment’s trade-oﬀ between costs and beneﬁts changes. As a general principle for both the
case with and that without commitment, the excess value of government funds times the
marginal revenue of taxes at period t is set equal to the marginal distortionary cost of taxes
in period t. Under commitment, the marginal distortionary cost depends on a weighted sum
of the wedges between ﬁrst-best and actual investments levels prior to t, where the weights
are determined by the depreciation structure. In contrast, if, due to a lack of commitment,
27The assumption that the government has no access to age-dependent taxes, upon which our results
depend, has been adopted elsewhere in the literature; see, for instance, Erosa and Gervais (2002).
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the government sets the tax for t no earlier than in period t− 1, the marginal cost of taxes
in period t depends only on the investment wedge in period t− 1, since all previous invest-
ments are then sunk, thus making decisions in diﬀerent periods more similar. In the smooth
Markov-perfect (limit-of-ﬁnite-horizon) equilibrium we look at, this leads to a dampening,
or complete elimination, of the ﬂuctuations we ﬁnd to be optimal under commitment. In
conclusion, the policy implications can diﬀer substantially depending on the extent of gov-
ernment commitment. Thus, our model suggests one avenue for testing the extent to which
commitment is present, at least if the other maintained assumptions of our analysis are met.
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7. Appendix
7.1. Derivation of equation (11)
From the deﬁnition
Tt ≡ βτ t+1 + (1− ρδ)
∞∑
s=2
βs (1− δ)s−2 τ t+s
it follows immediately that
Tt−1 − βτ t + (Tt − βτ t+1) βδ (1− ρ) = β (1− ρδ)Tt. (27)
Forward substitution implies
Tt−1 − βτ t = β (1− ρδ)
∞∑
s=0
(−βδ (1− ρ))s Tt+s +
lim
T→∞
(−βδ (1− ρ))T (Tt+T − βτ t+T )
= β (1− ρδ)
∞∑
s=0
(−βδ (1− ρ))s Tt+s,
where limT→∞ (−βδ (1− ρ))T (Tt+T − βτ t+T ) = 0, since taxes are bounded, implying that
their PDVs (in particular the Tts) are also bounded. In particular, the expression above
implies that
T0 = βτ 1 + β (1− ρδ)
∞∑
s=0
(−βδ (1− ρ))s Ts+1. (28)
Recall that, by deﬁnition, T0 ≡ βτ 1 + (1− ρδ)
∑∞
s=2 β
s (1− δ)s−2 τ s. This, together with
equation (28), implies that
∞∑
s=2
βs (1− δ)s−2 τ s = β
∞∑
s=0
(−βδ (1− ρ))s Ts+1. (29)
Finally, rearranging the expressions for Tˆ0 and Tˆ0 =
∑∞
s=1 β
s(1− δ)s−1τ s leads to
Tˆ0 = βτ 1 + (1− ρδ)
∞∑
s=2
βs(1− δ)s−2τ s − δ (1− ρ)
∞∑
s=2
βs(1− δ)s−2τ s,
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which, in turn, can be rewritten, using (28)-(29), as
Tˆ0 = T0 +
∞∑
s=1
(−βδ (1− ρ))s Ts,
which is expression (11) in the paper.
7.2. Details of the proof of Proposition 2
Solving (27) for τ t+1 yields
τ t+1 =
Tt−1 − βτ t − Ttβ (1− δ)
β2δ (1− ρ) .
Using (13) and the expression for τ ∗ given in the text to replace Tt−1 and Tt yields (for t ≥ 1)
τ t+1 = τ
1 + βδ (1− ρ)
βδ (1− ρ) − τ
1 + β (1− δ) δ (1− ρ)
δ2 (1− ρ)2 β2 2h1 (−δ (1− ρ))
t − τ t
βδ (1− ρ) .
The complete solution to this diﬀerence equation can be written
τ t = τ
∗ +
1 + βδ (1− δ) (1− ρ)
β
(
1− βδ2 (1− ρ)2) 2h1τ (−δ (1− ρ))t−1 + c
(
− 1
βδ (1− ρ)
)t
,
where c is an arbitrary integration constant. The interpretation of the arbitrary c is that there
is an inﬁnite number of tax sequences that implement the optimal allocation. However, since
the root of the homogeneous part, −1/ (βδ (1− ρ)), is outside the unit circle, the constraint
τ t ∈ [0, 1] is not satisﬁed for c = 0. Thus, the only feasible solution to (13) is determined by
setting c = 0. Writing this solution recursively yields the solution in Proposition (2).
The non-diverging dynamics implies that it is suﬃcient that τ 1 be bounded for guaran-
teeing a uniformly bounded τ t. Clearly, this condition is satisﬁed.
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Figure 1: Remaining stock of capital installed in period t − 1 with quasi-geometric de-
preciation (ρ ∈ (0, 1)). The parameter values in the example are ρ = 0.05 and δ = 0.5.
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Figure 2: Ramsey dynamics – an example with accelerating depreciation. The ﬁgure
displays the dynamic evolution of tax rates (τ t), present-value taxes (Tt), investments (it),
and net output (yt) in the optimal Ramsey allocation of Proposition 1. The parameter values
underlying the ﬁgures are δ = 0.7, ρ = 0, β = 0.8, and an initial stock of installed capital of
ho1 = 0.25. Moreover, the government expenditure are such that the Lagrange multiplier is
λ = 1.3.
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Figure 3: Upper panel displays the present-value taxes in case of high Th,t (black) and
low Tl,t (red) spending requirement. The lower panels displays the associated sequence of
tax rates. The dotted lines represent steady-state values for taxes conditional on war and
peace, respectively. The parameter values underlying this example are ρ = 0.1, p = 0.5, and
β = 0.75. Moreover, the government expenditures associated with war and peace are chosen
so that the Lagrange multipliers become λh = 2, and λl = 1.75, respectively.
